This is an example of overreacting.

TPM consistently makes solid, albeit partisan, points as it analyzes the political and policy scenes.  Along with similar blogs that favor the opposite side of the aisle, I find it must reading.

But it's way too early to get upset or to assume that there's a conspiracy at the Sunday talk shows because they booked Republicans this weekend.  Why?

The Republican coalition from the 1980s and 90s of social and financial conservatives has always been a marriage of convenience.

While there is some overlap between the two groups, for the most part the two lead very separate lives, sleep in separate bedrooms, and do very different things.  They joined together in political matrimony and were seen together in public because that was the easiest way for each one to have a chance at being in and exercising power.

So what happens when that chance decreases or collapses and severe troubles develop between the two previous marriage of convenience partners?  First, marriage counseling.  Second, either a reconciliation or divorce.

A new book has moved to the top of your fall term reading list: Reclaiming Conservatism: How a Great American Political Movement Got Lost--and How It Can Find Its Way Back by Mickey Edwards.  I picked it up after seeing Edwards appear on Bill Moyers Journal (watch it here).  In this interview, he posed a simple question for people like me who fancy themselves to be conservatives, "How did the Republican Party get from 1964 to here?"

In my day job, I'm the director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College.  Tomorrow marks the 100th anniversary of Rockefeller's birth.  To commemorate the occasion, The New York Times published an op-ed by noted historian Richard Norton Smith, who spoke at our Centennial events back in April.  Smith's conclusion is one with which I wholeheartedly agree:

Three decades later, “Rockefeller Republican” is widely seen as a contradiction in terms. Largely forgotten is the original meaning of the phrase, a counterintuitive coupling of late ’50s fiscal responsibility and early ’60s social justice — the same formula espoused by a majority of today’s electorate, for whom solving problems and forging consensus takes precedence over ideological purity.

I am rapidly becoming a big fan of Megan McCardle's McArdle's blog. I don't always agree with what I read, but it's always well-written and extremely thought-provoking.

This post from late last week really captured my imagination. Guest poster Jon Henke listed four factions within the Republican Party -- Progressive Republicans, Goldwater Republicans, Bush Republicans, and Status Quo Republicans -- and wondered aloud which would be alpha in the years ahead.

I have some quibbles with the four factions Henke listed. Bush and Status Quo Rs are basically the same group. I'm also sure a few others could be added.

But that's largely beside the point. The only thing these four groups really seem to have in common is that they all use the name "Republican." Other than than, the only real reason they have to work together is that they are opposed what each sees as comming from the Democratic Party.

I've been busy this past week with my day job as director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth.  The year 2008 marks two anniversaries for us: 100 years since Nelson Rockefeller was born and 25 years since the Center was founded at Dartmouth.  We are using the coincidence of the Centennial with the 2008 elections to examine Rockefeller's legacy in the three decades since he retired from public office.

From Dwight Eisenhower's farewell address:

 ...As we peer into society's future, we -- you and I, and our government --must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow.  We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.  We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

First when he was OMB director and then as chief of staff in the Clinton White House, Leon Panetta was famous (some might say infamous) for negotiating with congressional Republicans on the budget. He'd negotiate a deal in private and then either denounce it publically or come back the next day demanding something more. He was one of the reasons the Clinton administration ran circles around the GOP congressional majority that, led by Newt Gingrich, was assumed to be in control.