Please Stop Talking About Earmarks
Here's my column from today's Roll Call.
2009 Brings Yet Another Ridiculous Debate Over Earmarks
Is anyone else as bored and frustrated with the ongoing earmark debate as I am? You should be.
Why are earmarks, which are such a small part of the federal budget, always such a large part of the annual budget debate? Compared to all of the much more significant — in terms of economics, philosophy and dollars — budget issues that need to be discussed and decided, earmarks don’t even qualify as a top-10 concern, let alone something that should take up as much time and energy as they have the past few weeks. The seemingly constant fight over earmarks is a total distraction from everything else that needs to be considered and not at all worthy of anyone’s time.
The earmark debate is based on three very large and enduring myths.
First, contrary to what’s constantly either said or hinted at, eliminating an earmark does not result in lower spending. An earmark is nothing more than an agreement on how to allocate part of an appropriation. Cutting the earmark simply eliminates the allocation; the size of the appropriation remains the same.
Second, and also contrary to earmark mythology, cutting an earmark doesn’t mean favored projects won’t be funded. The only thing that’s accomplished when an earmark is removed is that the decision on how to allocate the funds is moved from Congress to a federal department or agency. Not only does that mean the overall spending isn’t reduced, it also means the project could still be funded. The department or agency that receives the funds may decide on its own that a project recommended by a Member of Congress is worthy. Removing the earmark would then have been of no value whatsoever.
Third, as much as earmark opponents would have us believe the opposite, the fact that allocations are made by a department or agency doesn’t mean the decisions will be made according to a strict checklist list of rigid and impartial criteria. As I wrote a little over a year ago, many funding proposals are not objectively comparable and that ultimately adds subjectivity to the decision process. The fact that the decisions are made by departments and agencies that are headed by administration appointees and overseen by Congress virtually guarantees that subjectivity will be a part of the system, no matter who makes the ultimate allocation decision.
Critics frequently say federal spending would be lower if the allocations were eliminated because Members would have less interest in voting for the spending bills. Just the opposite is true. If earmarks are completely eliminated and the allocation decision is moved to an agency, then the only way lawmakers will be able to get funds for their districts or states is by voting for the bill and then pushing the executive branch to see the merits of the specific projects that they want funded. Many more Members could end up voting for an appropriation because no one’s request for funds would yet have been refused.
The leadership or chairmen would then be in a position to say their project could, should and would be funded. Letters would be sent and floor colloquies would take place with Members asking whether a project could be accommodated in the appropriation being considered. Because the answer would always be “yes,” removing earmarks actually could increase the incentive to vote for appropriations.
This is not just theory. The debates on budget resolutions have frequently included communications like this between the Budget chairmen and individual Members of the House and Senate. The rank and file wanted some type of assurance that, even though it didn’t specifically say so, the budget resolution being considered would accommodate the funds they were seeking, or that it wouldn’t preclude the adoption of a certain tax cut that they were championing. The affirmative answer provided the justification that they needed to explain their vote back home.
A budget resolution does not include specific line items or program-by-program details and, therefore, is like an appropriation without earmarks. House Members and Senators often can be persuaded to vote for it because it doesn’t prevent the tax and spending changes that they prefer from being considered, even though the actual changes are never made in the budget resolution itself.
That’s what would happen if earmarks were eliminated from appropriations bills. In effect, every Member who wanted assurance that his or her favored spending or taxing project could be funded would get it. The fight would simply shift to another venue.
If earmark critics are truly interested in lowering overall federal spending, they are focused on the wrong target. Instead, they should be proposing to reduce the amount of overall spending in each appropriation itself.
But if earmark critics are interested in lowering federal spending, they also need to think far more broadly. Instead of earmarks, the focus should be on whether the government should continue to do all of the big things that it is currently doing. Earmarks are such a small part of overall federal spending that even if appropriations were reduced when earmarks were cut, which they are not, the effect on the budget would be barely noticeable.
So, as I said last February, this has to make you wonder why anyone is spending any time on any of this.
Earmarks
Stan, you are only serving to muddle the argument even more. I agree that earmarks normally don't increase spending and you are correct that Congressionally directed funding is something that is beneficial in many cases. But anyone familiar with the process knows that appropriations is an insiders game and many of the "earmarks" that are placed in either a bill or report language are an abuse of the process. The stories in the press about PMA were a secret only to those outside of Washington. Those of us involved in the process were aware of this insidious circle and were amazed that it went unreported for so long a period of time.
There is a simple solution to correcting the abuses of the process. We have put window dressing on the the problem by requiring the so-called transparency by listing the requests on web sites but in the end the money is still directed to the source the member requests. We have seen attempts at giving the President a line item veto struck down by the Courts and so Congress will have to address the issue within their own rules. A very simple solution would be to make each earmark request subject to a point of order on the floor of the House or Senate and to allow individual members to ask for a recorded vote on each item. Any request that is of merit will either survive such a vote or not have one requested, but those that of a more questionable nature would be in danger of failing. It would not take long for members to realize that they risk exposure if the offer up something that cannot stand that test.
Could you imagine the debate on the House floor if Congressman Flake asked for Congressman Murtha to explain these requests and then discuss the linkage between PMA, EOC and the campaign contributions. Now that would be "must see TV".
I agree, and ...
...as one who travels the Route 95 corridor, I am certainly grateful to the Maryland or Virginia Congresspeople responsible for the earmark that rebuilt the Woodrow Wilson Bridge before we travelers started falling into the Potomac.
Reform of the Appropriation Process
I agree that the final goal is likely not the complete elimination of earmarks. Appropriations need to be allocated by some method. However, it has long seemed that the current appropriation method is deeply flawed and leads to many problems. For example, Robert Byrd has chaired the Senate Committee on Appropriations for the past ten years that the Democrats have held a majority. On the other side, Ted Stevens chaired it for the six year up until 2005 when the Republicans held a majority. Both were well know for "bringing home the bacon". Now why should Byrd and Stevens, for whom I could not vote, have the right to bring home my tax dollars to benefit their states? In fact, this likely hurts anyone who tries to run against them. Most citizens of West Virginia and Alaska likely knew that, had they elected someone else, that person would likely not retain their state's chairmanship of the Appropriations Committee. This is a major motivation for citizens of all states to elect the same people again and again. That is the only way that they can gain the seniority needed to get the chairmanship of this and other powerful committees.
A couple of reforms could help address this problem. One would be to divide the appropriations between the states by some agreed-upon method. Each Senator could then play a role in the allocation of their state's share within their state. That way, their actions would only affect citizens of their own state and each of those citizens would have a right to vote for that Senator (or not).
Of course, all appropriations cannot be neatly divided between states. Hence, another reform would be to rotate the chairmanships of the committees between the states. This would keep any one state from monopolizing the appropriations process and lessen the motivation of voters to reelect their Senators and Representatives simply to gain seniority and the resulting chairmanships of powerful committees.