Single Payer, No. "Single" Pool, Yes.
The editorial page of today's (Manchester) Union Leader had this to say about Senator Shaheen's support for health care reform (my emphasis added):
In 1994, legislators passed Senate Bill 711, sponsored by state Sen. Jeanne Shaheen. The bill introduced what is called "community rating" to the state's health insurance market. Insurers in the small-group market (businesses with fewer than 100 employees) were forbidden from denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions and certain demographic factors. They were allowed to charge the old only three times what they charged the young.
At the time the law passed, 26 insurers offered coverage in New Hampshire's small-group market. Only eight years later, there were just five. Twelve years after the law passed, Rhode Island conducted a study of New Hampshire's health insurance market to see what legislators there could learn. They found that Shaheen's bill drove insurers out of the state and raised the cost of insurance for younger, healthier residents while lowering it for the old and sick.
The parts I have emphasized reveals what Republicans have gotten wrong about the health care reform debate that they should be getting right. Raising costs to the healthy and lowering them for the sick are exactly what insurance reform is supposed to do. (I do think that insurance premiums should be related to age, for reasons I make clear below.) If having to cover pre-existing conditions is what drove insurers from the state, then there is very little loss for their going.
The ability to have competitive insurance markets depends on insurance companies being protected from adverse selection problems. There are two ways to do this. The first is to just have one pool of insureds in a given region. This is what happens in a single-payer system by definition. But this eliminates any benefit to competitive markets, and you get all of the baggage that comes with the way that system would operate in the U.S. The second is to have a mechanism by which insurers who cover pools that have predictably lowerhigher-cost populations get compensated by insurers who cover pools that have predictably higherlower-cost populations. (This is why age should be a factor that can affect premium levels.) In some parts of the country, there are firms that do this type of risk adjustment for multiple insurers competing within a given pool. If this transfer mechanism works properly, then we don't have to give up the benefits of choice and competition in the delivery of health care services to correct obvious problems in the workings of health insurance markets.
I cannot figure out why more Republicans aren't pushing for this outcome -- more, not less, community rating as described by the Union Leader but with appropriate risk-adjustment procedures to ensure that the competition happens along dimensions we want, like quality of service, rather than dimensions that we don't want, like the health of the insured population. The core Republican voter is a middle-class guy with a decent job and a family living in suburbia. He doesn't have too much to worry about, but the one at the top of the list is that something happens to his family and he can't protect them. For example, his kid gets sick and his insurance drops him, or he loses his job, or anything else that causes the kid's illness to become a pre-existing condition to a new insurance company. All the Republicans have to do to score political points is make sure that guy is happy with reform.
I recognize that this is not all that should happen as part of health care reform, but this first step costs very little money, promotes competition in health insurance markets, and provides a good foundation for further reforms, like extending coverage to more populations that, even with community rating plus risk adjustment, won't have insurance.


I'm afraid I don't understand
I'm afraid I don't understand how a single-payer system would eliminate choice and competition for the delivery of _health care services_.
Simple incentive scheme
Isn't this just a simple incentive scheme to give insurance companies an incentive to cover people who are "higher risk."
Shouldn't this be the other
Shouldn't this be the other way around?
"The second is to have a mechanism by which insurers who cover pools that have predictably lower-cost populations get compensated by insurers who cover pools that have predictably higher-cost populations."
Yes, I'll fix it.
Thanks.
The Republicans can't say what they need to
Or, rather, they're not allowed to by their donor base. The reason to fear a single payer system in the US is that there's no one to appeal to or oversee decision making. Everyone (especially base Republican voters with jobs and insurance) knows that insurance companies, once their rates are set, make bonuses for the executives by denying coverage. If there were no correction mechanism other than equity courts (good luck, there) then this behavior would be unchecked.
They could effectively run on this well-founded loathing of health insurance companies and their bureaucratic executives...but of course, they'd be out of money when the next election comes, so they can't. Bummer.
Dehumanization of millions in our society
To have a pre-existing condition and be denied any medical insurance coverage makes you a "throwaway" person in our society.
The irony is that the party of "pro-life" has no problem with dehumanization of millions of human lives by making them outcasts when it comes to basic healthcare.
That's the present system -- the status quo that they are fighting to preserve.
NH's experience: the real problem is not clear to me
"'They found that Shaheen's bill drove insurers out of the state and raised the cost of insurance for younger, healthier residents while lowering it for the old and sick'...
[But] "Raising costs to the healthy and lowering them for the sick are exactly what insurance reform is supposed to do."
~~~~
Well then that wouldn't seem the problem is NH's community rating per se -- if insurance premiums for the healthy were raised by an amount sufficient to offset their reduction for the ill, the result to the insurance companies would be a wash, so why would they leave town?
If in fact they were financially driven out of the state, then it would seem they were regulated in such a way that they weren't allowed to raise their premiums on the well by enough to offset the new subsidies they had to give others. (Then that 3x premium cap on old versus young could be a financial crusher).
See for instance McArdle's description of community rating in New York (where I am lucky enough to pay my insurance premiums).
BTW, while adverse selection is the classic problem for all kinds of insurance in economic theory, is it really so in actual business practice?
I'm hardly an expert on insurance, but there certainly are studies saying otherwise ... Factually, for health insurance adverse selection problems would indicate the ill and high-risk would be disporportionately uninsured, which is not so (and surprising even absent adverse selection problems, since one would expect them to be disprortionately uninsured for other reasons) ... and advantageous selection is also known to exist in the health insurance market.
Also, Bryan Caplan had some interesting observations...
"...In a mandatory insurance regime, however, the Low-Risk have to buy the policy. The result: The regulation is efficiency-enhancing, because it takes $160 from every Low-Risk person in order to give $190 to every High-Risk person.
"So far, so good. It's conceivable for mandatory insurance regs to improve market performance.
"But their argument jumps the shark when defenders of government insurance regulation notice the existence of mandatory insurance regulations, and infer that these regs are doing something about adverse selection. When you actually look at these regs, you'll notice some peculiarities: ..."
So what is wrong with
So what is wrong with shifting resources from the $160 to the $190 paying group?
Remember, anyone in the $160 paying segment may suddenly find themselves in the $190 segment tomorrow and almost certainly will at some point..
Re: So what is wrong with...
"So what is wrong with shifting resources from the $160 to the $190 paying group?"
Nothing is wrong at that point. However...
"When you actually look at these regs, you'll notice some peculiarities: ..."
You have to click on the link to keep reading about the peculiarites.
I'm not going to re-post the entire post there in a comment here.